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COMMENTS
THE MEANING, SCOPE AND VALIDITY OF THE
OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS WHICH
APPLY TO THE UNINSURED MOTORIST
ENDORSEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The "Other Insurance" clause of an Uninsured Motorist endorse-
ment is a reduction provision similar to the provisions for reductions
due to receipt of workmen's compensation benefits or medical payment
benefits. Its purpose, as reflected in the policy language and limits, is
to limit the insured's recovery in an uninsured motorist situation to the
recovery of a sum equal to the minimum financial responsibility limits
of that state. That purpose has been secured in a majority of jurisdic-
tions. However, a strong minority of jurisdictions has rejected that
purpose as repugnant to Uninsured Motorist legislation.
In jurisdictions where these policy provisions have not been con-
sidered, ample precedent exists for each side to bolster its arguments
for or against limiting recovery. This paper is a collation of that prece-
dent. In the jurisdictions where a final determination has been reached
in regard to the pertinent policy provisions, the way is open for creative
policy revision by the insurance industry or legislative amendment to
allow attainment of the limitation.
The policy provisions regarding "Other Insurance" are as follows:
[taken from the 1963 Countrywide Endorsement; a comparison of the
various provisions is provided in Appendix A]
Other Insurance: With respect to bodily injury to an insured
while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured
this insurance shall apply only as excess insurance over any other
similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such
automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then
apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this
coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other
insurance.
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured
has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to
the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the high-
er of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater
proportion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the
limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable
limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance.
While variances in policy language prevent airtight classification,
the problems involving the "Other Insurance" provisions can be sepa-
rated into two groups:
1. Where the claimant is an insured under clause II (a) (1) of
the Uninsured Motorist endorsement as a named insured or
additional insured, and also is an insured under clause II (a)
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(2) of another policy providing uninsured motorist coverage
as an occupant of an insured vehicle.
2. Where the claimant is an insured under clause II (a) (1)
of a Uninsured Motorist endorsement as a named insured or
additional insured in two or more policies providing uninsured
motorist protection.
This paper will thus be organized into two sections around those
groups. Within each section majority and minority positions will be
analyzed separately, and within those positions each jurisdiction will
be treated separately.
When considering the "Other Insurance" question it must be kept
in mind that "Other Insurance" clauses are not found exclusively in
Uninsured Motorist endorsements. Such clauses are prevalent in all
insurance policies. While an analysis of the existing law in each juris-
diction as to "Other Insurance" clauses in non-uninsured motorist situ-
ations is beyond the scope of this article, that law must be researched
before an attempt is made to construe the Uninsured Motorist "Other
Insurance" clause in a particular fact situation.
I. CASE I: WHERE THE CLAIMANT IS AN INSURED UNDER
CLAUSE II (a) (1) OF THE UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSE-
MENT AS A NAMED INSURED OR ADDITIONAL INSURED, AND
ALSO Is AN INSURED UNDER CLAUSE II (a) (2) OF ANOTHER
POLICY PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE AS AN
OCCUPANT OF AN INSURED VEHICLE.
The usual case involves an injured party who is a passenger in an
automobile covered by an Uninsured Motorist endorsement, and the
passenger also has Uninsured Motorist coverage on his own automobile.
Paragraph 1 of the "Other Insurance" clause of both policies will
probably provide that:
With regard to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an
automobile not owned by the principal named insured, the insur-
ance under this endorsement shall apply only as excess insurance
over any other similar insurance available to such insured and
applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this in-
surance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit
liability for this coverage exceeds the sum of the applicable limits
of liability of such other insurance. (Emphasis added.)
The first section of this clause is the excess clause, which limits
liability to situations where the primary coverage has been completely
exhausted; the second section is the escape clause, by which the company
will avoid any liability even where the primary coverage is exhausted
unless its coverage limit exceeds the limits of the primary coverage.
Thus, the clause is known as an "excess-escape" clause.
In actuality the clause is almost always an escape clause. The limits
of Uninsured Motorist coverage are generally the same as the limits
imposed by the financial responsibility laws. Thus, both the host and
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the guest, if from the same state, will have the same Uninsured Motor-
ist coverage limits, and the second section in the guest's own policy will
relieve his own insurer of liability.' The excess-escape clause therefore
merely works to provide recovery only under the host's policy, and-
works no hardship on the guest-insured. Of course, where there are
several injured parties or where the guest-insured's damages exceed
the host's Uninsured Motorist limits, the possibility of reduced recov-
ery exists. However, that same possibility is present where the negli-
gent party carries liability insurance.
The majority of jurisdictions where the "Other Insurance" clause
has been the subject of litigation have held that the clause is clear,
unambiguous, and therefore enforceable. The leading case on this
point is Burcham v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.2 Here the insured-
passenger settled with the host's carrier under its Uninsured Motorist
endorsement and then proceeded against his father's insurer under three
policies containing the 1956 Uninsured Motorist endorsement. In up-
holding the defendant's contention that the first paragraph of the "Other
Insurance" clause creates an excess-escape clause the court said:
Under this construction plaintiff is entitled to all it was con-
tracted that he should receive . . . . It is clear the companies
intended to sell less coverage and the insureds to buy less cover-
age, "while occupying an automobile not owned by a named
insured."3
This view of the "Other Insurance" clause as an excess-escape
clause has been followed in eleven jurisdictions. 4 Whether the Unin-
I See Appendix, infra at p. 409.
2255 Ia. 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963).
3Id. at -, 121 N.W.2d at 503.
4Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 448 S.W.2d
652 (Ark. 1970); M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Company v. Wallace, 245 Ark.
230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968); Pinkus v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty In-
surance Co., 292 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Ark. 1968); State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company v. De La Cruz, 283 Ala. 711, 214 So. 2d 909 (1968);
Phoenix Assurance Company of N.Y. v. Larsen, 50 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Cal. App.
1966); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y.,
49 Cal. Rptr. 238 (Cal. App. 1966); Gainfeld v. Pacific Automobile Insurance
Company, 42 Cal. Rptr. 516 (Cal. App. 1965); Kirby v. Ohio Casualty In-
surance Company, 42 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Cal. App. 1965); Cricto v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 472 (Cal. App. 1969); Bitnam
v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company, 110 Ill. App. 2d 103, 249 N.E2d
159 (1969); Tindall v. Farmers Auto Management Corp., 83 Ill. App. 2d 165,
226 N.E.2d 397 (1967); Vignali v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 71 Ill.
App. 2d 114, 216 N.E.2d 827 (1966); Burcham v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, note 2 supra; Lott v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.,
223 So. 2d 492 (La. App. 1969) ; LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So. 2d 791(La. App. 1969); Broussard v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 188 So. 2d
111 (La. App. 1966); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213
A.2d 420 (1965) ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Estate of Baker, 22 App. Div. 2d
658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964); Garcia v. Motor Vehicle Accident Corp., 18
App. Div. 2d 62, 238 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1963) ; Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Cas.
Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 541 (1964); Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157,
417 P.2d 658 (1966) ; Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 405 P.2d
712 (1965).
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sured Motorist statute involved gives the insured a "right of rejection"
seems to be immaterial, since four of these jurisdictions5 have manda-
tory coverage while seven jurisdictions have a "right of rejection." 6
In Burcham, the Iowa court did not discuss the effect of the statu-
tory Uninsured Motorist requirement. However, the requirement has
been considered and the policy provisions found not to be repugnant
to the statutes in Arkansas, California, Illinois, New Hampshire, Utah
and Washington.7 The California cases, however, can be distinguished
somewhat because of the particular statutory language of Section 11580.2
(d), California Insurance Code, which makes a special provision for
this type of clause.
In Childers v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.8 and Safeco
Ins. Co. of Amnerica v. Robey, 9 federal courts initially had held that the
excess-escape clauses were violative of the Arkansas statutory require-
ments of minimum protection to be afforded under the Uninsured
Motorist statutes and therefore allowed the aggregating of two policies
affording Uninsured Motorist coverage. In M.F.A. Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Wallace"° the Arkansas state court reversed the federal courts in
holding:
The cases interpreting uninsured motorist statutes go both ways
on the issue of stacking multiple policies covering the same acci-
dent or injury. However, in looking at the terms and purposes
of our statute, we find that the other insurance clause is not re-
pungnant to Arkansas statute, Section 66-4003, supra. Here
M.F.A. furnished uninsured motorist coverage "in not less than
limits described . . ." in the safety responsibility act. Furthermore,
since the purpose of the statute is one "for the protection of per-
sons injured ... who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles . . ." it is
obvious that the statute was not designed to provide the insured
with greater insurance protection than would have been available
had the insured been injured by an operator with a policy con-
taining the minimum statutory limits required by the motor
vehicle safety responsibility act . . .11
The following federal cases arrived at the same result but were overruled
by later state court decisions: Chandler v. Gov't Emp. Ins. Co., 342 F.2d
420 (5th Cir. 1965); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Well, 209 F. Supp. 784
(W.D. Va. 1962).
5 ILL. INS. CODE 755a. § 143a(1) (Supp. 1970) ; N.H. REv. STATS. ANN. § 268:15-
a(1) (Supp. 1969); N.Y. Ixs LAWS §§ 600 et seq. (Supp. 1970); S.C. CODE
OF LAWS § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1969).
6 ARK. I &S. CODE § 66-4003 (1966) ; CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(a) (Supp. 1969);
IOWA INS. CODE § 516 A.1 (Supp. 1970); LA. INS. CODE § 1406 D (1) (Supp.
1964); UTAH CODE ANNO. § 41-12-12.1 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE § 48.22.030
(Supp. 1969).
7 See note 4, supra.
8 282 F. Supp. 866 (G.D. Ark. 1968).
9 399 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968), effectively overruled with Childers, note 8
supra, by M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d
742 (1968).
10245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968).
11 Id. at 744.
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The decision in Childers was later vacated on the basis of the Wallace
decision.12 Some confusion still seems to exist in Arkansas, however.
Two decisions in the Arkansas Federal Courts have distinguished Wal-
lace from Robey and have allowed aggregation of coverage. 3
In the Alabama case of State Farm Automobile Insurance Co. v.
DeLaCruz'4 the court held in accord with the majority position:
In the present case, we hold that the language in the policy is
clear and unambiguous, and means that if the insured can recover
under any other insurance policy, the present policy would only
provide excess coverage in the amount by which the applicable
limit of liability of the present policy exceeds the applicable limits
of all other insurance. In the present case the applicable limits
of the appellant's policy and the Allstate policy, under which the
plaintiff recovered, are the same. Therefore, this provision pre-
cludes the plaintiff from recovery under the apellant's policy.' 5
The Louisiana decision in LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co.' 6 points out
one of the principal reasons for upholding the "Other Insurance"
clauses:
The purpose of the statute in making uninsured motorist cov-
erage compulsory, it has been said is to give the same protection
to the person injured by an uninsured motorist as he would have
had if he had been injured in an accident caused by an automo-
bile covered by a standard liability insurance policy.' 7
The rationale of the court is that if the clause is not upheld the insured
could effectively receive greater protection by aggregating Uninsured
Motorist coverage than he would have received if the uninsured motor-
ist had carried the minimum financial responsibility limits of liability
insurance.
In New York the court has stressed the clarity and unambiguous
nature of the language of the policy:
The applicable limits of liability on both Norman and Abra-
ham's policy were $10,000/$20,000. Thus the applicable limits of
Norman's policy did not exceed the applicable limits of Abra-
ham's policy. The language is clear and free of ambiguity that
since the limits of Norman's policy did not exceed Abraham's
excess coverage cannot be applied to Norman's policy.' 8
As will be seen, the minority view attacks the "Other Insurance"
clause as ambiguous because both policies purport to limit liability to
1Id.
"3 Treece v. Home Insurance Co., 295 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Ark. 1967) and Wool-
ston v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 306 F. Supp. 738 (W.D.
Ark. 1969) distinguished from Wallace.
'4 283 Ala. 711, 214 So. 2d 909 (1968).
5 Id. at 912.
"6 194 So. 2d 791 (La. App. 1967).
17 Id. at 796.
Is Globe Indemnity v. Estate of Baker, 22 N.Y.2d 658, 253 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172
(1964).
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damages in excess of another policy. What the minority viewpoint
overlooks is that the clause providing that the policy will only apply
where the insured is occupying a non-owned automobile effectively
solves the problem. The policy that covers the non-owned automobile
clearly is the primary coverage.
If public policy declares a need for overriding this unambiguous
language in the policy, then the legislature should be the one to change
the contract, and not the courts. In this regard, however, it might be
best for the insurance industry to add a section to this clause which
effectively restates its purpose in view of the decisions in the minority
jurisdictions.
Two theories have been used by those courts which refuse to en-
force the "Other Insurance" clause.
The Lamb-Weston doctrine, as developed by the Oregon supreme
court, declares (1) "Other Insurance" clauses in two policies are re-
pugnant to each other and, (2) there is no logical basis on which to
decide which policy is primary insurance and which is secondary
insurance. Thus, says the court, both clauses ought to be completely
disregarded and recovery should be allowed up to the maximum limits
of both policies. Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance
CO. 19
In Wisconsin, in Ermis v. Federal Windows Manufacturing Co.,20
the court held that where two mutually repugnant excess clauses were
present they would be disregarded; rather than allowing recovery on
both policies, however, the court ruled ". . . that the liability must be
pro-rated between the companies." Although Ermis was not unin-
sured motorist case, the doctorine was applied in an uninsured motorist
situation in Reetz v. Werch.2 1
The second ground used by courts as a basis for invalidating the
"Other Insurance" clause is that the clause is repugnant to the statutory
language requiring Uninsured Motorist coverage in a given amount.
The view is that if the company is not liable for the statutory amount,
the insurance does not conform to the statute.
The leading case supporting this position is Bryant v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.22 Here the insured was covered by two
Uninsured Motorist endorsements issued by the defendant. Under one
he was a named insured and under the other he was a permissive user
of his father's truck. The judgment against the uninsured motorist
19Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Automobile Insurance Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341
P.2d 110 (1959). Lamb-Weston was not itself an uninsured motorist case but
the philosophy was followed in two uninsured motorist cases: Smith v.Pacific Automobile Insurance Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965) and
Spurling v. Allstate Insurance Co., 249 Ore. 471, 439 P.2d 616 (1968).
20 7 Wis. 2d 549, 97 N.W.2d 485 (1959).218 Wis. 2d 388, 98 N.W.2d 924 (1959).
'2 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (1965).
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was greater than the combined limits of both policies. The court de-
clared the "Other Insurance" provisions to be repugnant to the state's
Uninsured Motorist statute and allowed recovery up to the combined
limits of each endorsement available to the injured insured. The Bryant
case effectively overruled Travelers Ind. Co. v. Wells,2 3 a federal case
arising under Virginia Law. The Bryant decision has been followed in
six and possibly seven jurisdictions. 24
Of the eight jurisdictions holding this view, only Virginia has man-
datory Uninsured Motorist coverage. The other states have "right of
rejection" statutes.
In the Arizona case of Transport Insurance Co. v. Wade2- the plain-
tiff's decedent was a passenger in a vehicle owned by the decedent but
driven by his brother. The vehicle was struck by an uninsured motorist
whose negligence was the sole cause of the plaintiff's decedent's death.
At the time of the accident the decedent had insurance with Farmers In-
surance Exchange, providing Uninsured Motorist coverage up to $10,-
000 and the plaintiff had been paid the maximum amount under that
policy. Damages to the plaintiff as a result of the accident exceeded
$10,000. The brother also had a policy in force at the time of the
accident which provided Uninsured Motorist coverage. The plaintiff
made a claim against this policy. The defendant Transport Insurance
Co. refused to pay the claim, invoking the "Other Insurance" clause
of the policy. The court, holding that there was coverage and invali-
dating the "Other Insurance" clause, said:
In this case the policy provision seeks not to offset liability
coverage against uninsured motorist coverage as in Geyer, but
is seeking to offset uninsured motorist coverage against uninsured
motorist coverage. In each situation, however, it is the uninsured
motorist coverage that the company is attempting to reduce or
deny.
It is our opinion that Arizona's uninsured motorist statute is
designed to protect the insured as to his actual loss within such
limits and his recovery shall not extend past his actual loss. How-
ever, our statute does not limit an insured to only one $10,000
recovery where his loss exceeds that amount and he is benefi-
23316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).24 Guthrie v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 279 F. Supp. 837 (D.S.C.
1968); White v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir.
1966) ; Pulley v. Allstate Insurance Co., 242 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Va. 1965) ;
Geyer v. Reserve Insurance Co., 8 Ariz. App. 464, 447 P.2d 556 (1968) ; Trans-
port Insurance Company v. Wade, 11 Ariz. App. 14, 461 P2d 190 (1969);
Kraft v. Allstate Insurance Company, 6 Ariz. App. 276, 431 P.2d 917 (1967);
Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969);
Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414, 167 S.E2d 174
(1969) ; Sellers v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, 185 So. 2d
689 (Fla. 1966); Moore v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company Group, 270,
N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967); Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company vw
Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968) ; and cases at note 13, supra.2511 Ariz. App. 14,461 P2d 190 (1969).
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ciary of more than one policy issued under A.P.R.S. Sec. 20-259.01. While a minimum amount is set by the statute, nowhere
does the act place a limit on the total amount of recovery. 6
In a Kansas case, Sturdy v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 27 the
court touched on the problem of extra premiums for the extra cover-
age under each of the policies:
It must be borne in mind the purpose of uninsured motorist
insurance is to provide compensation for personal injury to the
innocent victim of the uninsured motorist. As to the named
insured the coverage is a contract benefit for which he is paid.
Here the damages to the insured have been determined and now
he seeks indemnity for it. He is not seeking any windfall as a
result of his injury but is seeking full indemnity based on pay-
ment of two separate premiums.
Defendant argues that what plaintiff is seeking amounts to pyra-
miding coverage but nothing is said about pyramiding the pre-
miums which effectuate the coverages. We would not be under-
stood as implying that an injured insured can pyramid separate
coverages in the same policy so at to recover more than his actual
loss.28
However, what the court neglected to consider is that with each
additional automobile there is an increased risk and increased exposure
and that this increased risk and exposure is the consideration for the
extra premium.2
9
One caveat inserted by all of the courts agreeing with the minority
viewpoint is that no claimant can recover more than his actual losses.
For example, in Harleysville Mutual Casualty Company v. Blumling, 30
the Pennsylvania supreme court said:
We do not wish to imply that injured parties may be permitted
to pyramid separate coverages so as to recover more than the
actual loss. Such a ruling is not necessary to the decision of this
case and we do not make it.31
There is some broad language in a Florida case, Sellers v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Cornpany,a which caused some commentators to
fear that Florida might allow double recoveries. However, later cases
in Florida have apparently limited this type of pyramiding of coverages
to actual indemnification. 33
26Id. at 192.
27203 Kan. 783, 457 P.2d 34 (1969).
28 Id. at 41, 42.
29 See Ringenburger v. General Accident F. & L. Assur. Corp., 214 So. 2d 376
(Fla. App. 1968).
30429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
31Id. at 115.
3 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
33 But see Mid-Central Mut. Cas. Co. v. Spanjer, 101 Ill. App. 2d 468, 243 N.E.2d
452 (1968).
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Those who disagree with the minority position argue that allowing
a claimant to recover under more than one Uninsured Motorist endorse-
ment puts the claimant in a better position than he would have been
against an insured negligent motorist with only the minimum coverage.
Professor Alan I. Widiss in his book, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist
Coverage (1969), takes issue with this criticism by alleging that the
conclusion that an insurer should therefore be allowed to reduce his
liability is a non sequitor. What Professor Widiss overlooks is that
the conclusion does follow from the terms of the contract of insurance
and that the premium was underwritten on the basis of the terms of
that contract. Professor Widiss apparently recognizes this fact later
in his book when he admits, "To the extent that risk is thereby in-
creased, companies can seek an increase in their premiums." Professor
Widiss also suggests that the optimum solution would be a redrafting
of the "Other Insurance" clause so that it would only become opera-
tive after a claimant has been fully compensated by "Other Insurance."
Assuming that the motoring public is willing to pay the type of pre-
mium necessary for this type of insurance and also assuming that the
insurance industry can underwrite this type of coverage, Professor
Widiss's suggestion has merit. However, whether this result is
properly achieved by judicial redrafting of an insurance contract is
open to serious doubt.
II. CASE II: WHERE THE CLAIMANT Is AN INSURED UNDER
CLAUSE II (a) (1) OF AN UNINSURED MOTORIST ENDORSE-
MENT AS A NAMED INSURED OR ADDITIONAL INSURED IN Two
OR MORE POLICIES PROVIDING UNINSURED MOTORIST PRO-
TECTION.
The policy provisions in this regard are as follows:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured
has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher
of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall
not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this
coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the
sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other insurance.
Usually the same company has issued both policies to the insured
so that the most important consideration is not the proration provision,
but rather the provision which deems damages to be no greater than
the limits of the applicable policies. This is supposed to limit the
recovery to $10,000 and not $20,000 where there are two policies.
There are two types of situations involved in this area:
1. Where the claimant has one policy which provides coverage
for two or more vehicles and a single Uninsured Motorist
endorsement and only one premium is charged therefor.
1970]
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2. Where the claimant has two distinct policies on two automo-
biles with an Uninsured Motorist endorsement on each and
has paid a separate premium for each of the endorsements.
In the first situation the following jurisdictions have held that the
claimant is only entitled to one Uninsured Motorist protection and is
not allowed to aggregate coverage for two or more vehicles.
A conflict in the Florida Appelate Court decisions between Sellers v.
Government Employees Insurance Company34 and Ringenberger v.
General Accident F. and L. Assur. Corp.35 was resolved by the supreme
court in Morrison Assurance Company, Inc. v. Pollak,36 when it held
that the insurance company liability is "clearly and unambiguously"
limited to the statutory minimum for one person for one accident. The
Morrison case involved one insurance policy covering two automobiles,
including Uninsured Motorist protection in the amount of $10,000. A
premium of $7.00 was charged for Uninsured Motorist coverage on the
first automobile and $5.00 for the Uninsured Motorist coverage on
the second vehicle. When the plaintiff's husband was killed in an
automobile accident involving an uninsured motorist she filed a claim
for $20,000, the aggregate amount of coverage on both cars. Morrison
would only pay $10,000. -The trial court found for the insured and its
decision was affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals; but
on appeal to the Supreme Court that judgment was reversed.3 7
The same result has been reached in New York in Polland v.
Allstate Insurance Company.3 8 Here, however, the court based its de-
cision on language in the policy that provided, "When two or more au-
tomobiles are insured by this policy, the terms of this policy shall apply
separately to each . . ." This is the type of clear policy language which
should be used to prevent conflict. In Polland the infant plaintiff was
injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned by one
DiVesto and operated by Thomas Haynes. A verdict of $36,800 was
returned. The plaintiff's father, with whom he resided at the time of
the accident, was the owner of an Allstate Insurance Company auto-
mobile insurance policy with limits of liability of $10,000 per person
and $40,000 per occurrence. The policy covered both a Thunderbird
and a Volkswagen owned by the father. Following the entry of judg-
ment, defendant paid to the plaintiff $9,086.42, her proportionate share
of the $10,000 coverage under said policy. The action was brought to
compel the defendant to pay an additional $10,000 on the theory that
34 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966).
35 214 So. 2d 376 (Fla. App. 1968).
36 230 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1969).
3 See also Hilton v. Citizen's Insurance Company of New Jersey, 201 So. 2d
904 (Fla. App. 1967).
38 25 App. Div. 2d 16, 266 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1966).
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the defendant had, in effect, issued two separate policies. The recovery
was limited to $10,000.
The Oregon supreme court also considered this question and denied
aggregation of coverage. In Castle v. United Pacific Insurance Group,39
the court distinguished the Lamb-Weston doctrine on the basis that this
was "not a situation of two or more policies applying to the same
vehicle. It was just the opposite in that it involved two distinct policy
coverages, all in one policy, extending to two separate vehicles." The
court went on to say that "the premium paid and the coverage ex-
tended to each of the two automobiles was simply to provide this form
of coverage for each of the insured's vehicles."
Washington has also joined the majority in this regard in two
cases.40
In two jurisdictions, Illinois and Louisiana, claimants have been
allowed to aggregate coverage for each vehicle for one accident. In
Deterding v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.41 the insured was
operating a pick-up truck when he was fatally injured. The insurer had
issued to the insured two automobile liability policies, one on the pick-
up truck and another on his automobile. The insurance company argued
that the "Other Insurance" provisions of the policies were applicable
and that the policies would have to be prorated, resulting in the pay-
ment of $5,000 under each policy. The court held that:
This situation was somewhat different since the insured was not
occupying an automobile which he did not own since he did own
the automobile that was involved in the accident. The exclusions
apply only if bodily injury occurred while the insured was occu-
pying an automobile not owned by a named insured under this
coverage.4
In the Louisiana case of Fremin v. Collins 3 the court held that:
We are likewise convinced that the payment of $5,000 by one
of the insurers herein to the insured under its contract of insur-
ance did not in any way exonerate the other company from such
payment under its respective policy.44
Here the court reasoned that since there were separate and distinct acts
and agreements which applied to each separate and distinct automobile,
recovery should be allowed on each policy.
39 448 P.2d 357 (Ore. 1968).
40 Pacific Indemnity Company v. Thompson, 56 Wash. 2d 715, 355 P.2d 12 (1960);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Bafus, Wash. _ 466
P.2d 159 (1970).
41 78 Ill. App. 29, 222 N.E.2d 523 (1966).
- Id. at 527.
43 194 So. 2d 470 (La. App. 1967).
44 Id. at 474.
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In the second situation two jurisdictions, Arkansas 5 and Michigan,4G
have not allowed the claimant to aggregate coverage under separate
policies on separate cars; one jurisdiction4 7 has allowed aggregation.
It seems clear to this writer that where there is but one policy on
two automobiles with but one premium for the Uninsured Motorist
endorsement, there should be only one policy coverage. Even where
there are two premiums charged in one policy for two automobiles, the
rationale of Ringenberger should be adopted: that ". . . [T] he premiums
represent the increased risk assumed with respect to the additional
owned automobile of the insured." For the same reasons, where there
are separate policies with separate premiums, the same result should fol-
low because of the increased exposure due to the second car. That is
the basis on which the contract was written and the desire to fully
indemnify the insured should not be allowed to cause a rewriting of
that contract.
III. CONCLUSIONS
What began as minimum protection against the Uninsured Motorist
is slowly becoming total first party protection against the uninsured
motorist. While a majority of jurisdictions hold the line, a strong
minority have applied the principal of indemnification to aggreate poli-
cies which contain clear and unambiguous language designed precisely
to avoid that result.
The ultimate effect of such decisions is best stated by J. Cris Soich
in his article, Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Past, Present and Future:
Once it has been determined that an innocently injured motorist
may recover under the terms of the uninsured motorist coverage
up to the total of the available limits or to the limit of his actual
loss, the potential aftermath of this decision must be considered.
Clearly a decision of this sort must have an impact upon the gen-
eral public in the economic sphere. It is submitted that the insur-
ance industry must, in view of . . . [these] decision [s], under-
take a careful and thorough study of its underwriting procedures
relative to this particular coverage .... it is clear that the industry
can no longer treat the uninsured motorist coverage as excess
liability coverage. It is equally clear that, since every uninsured
motorist coverage is now of a primary nature, the premium to
be charged must be adjusted accordingly. This eventual adjust-
ment must also have an immediate impact upon the general
motoring public, for they will be the ones required to absorb
the additional cost of the coverage.48
JAMIEs R. GASS
46 Horn v. Detroit Automobile Inter. Insurance Exchange, 379 Mich. 562, 153
N.W.2d 655 (1967).
47 Drewry v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 204 Va. 231, 129
S.E.2d 681 (1963).
45 M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Company v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742
(1968).
486 DuQ. L. REv. 341 (1968).
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